Note that the second rule cannot be translated into a single FIP, for it uses the 'or' operator. Replacing 'and' by 'or' and 'or' by 'and' we obtain a flat dilation. Using weighted rules, more elaborate operators can be built. The output image of the program below is depicted in Fig. 4 and the processing time was 14s:
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The authors present an improvement to the Nyang-Song scheme which achieves the same security level without increasing the cost of signature generation, and which offers two significant advantages.
Introduction:
In 1979, Rabin [I] proposed a digital signature whose security is based on the difficulty of finding square roots modulo a composite number. Rabin's scheme provides a fast signature verification, which only requires one calculation of the adopted one-way hash function, one multiplication and one addition modulo a composite number n, where n is the product of two large primes. Note that in Rabin's scheme, the signer cannot generate the valid signatures for some messages if their corresponding signature equations are not solvable. Whenever the signature equation is solvable, it has four solutons (square roots) in which the signer can choose one of them as the signature of the message. Since then, several signature schemes derived from Rabin's scheme have been proposed in the literature [2 -E]. However, they require a large public key [2 -4, 71, and need iterative checks to verify a signature [7, 81. Recently, Nyang and Song [9] proposed a fast digital signature scheme derived from Rabin's scheme. The Nyang-Song scheme has the following characteristics: (i) all signature equations are solvable; (ii) it requires no more iterative checks for signature verification. Moreover, in the Nyang-Song scheme, each of the public key and the secret key is shortened to 21nl bits, and it requires one calculation of the adopted one-way hash function and four modular multiplications (in Z,) for signature verification.
In this Letter, we propose an improvement to the Nyang-Song fast digital signature. The improvement achieves the same security level as the original Nyang-Song scheme, without increasing the cost of signature generation. The improvement preserves the characteristics inherent in the Nyang-Song scheme. In addition, it has two significant advantages: (i) it is faster for signature verification than the Nyang-Song scheme, since two modular multiplications are eliminated; (ii) each of the public key and the secret key for each user is shortened to I n1 bits, while the Nyang-Song scheme needs 21nl bits. However, the sue of a digital signature generated by the improvement is one bit longer than the original one.
Review of Nyang-Song scheme: Denote by QR, the set which contains all quadratic residues modulo p , and NQR, the set which contains all quadratic nonresidues modulo The Nyang-Song scheme works as follows.
System initialisation: Initially, each user selects two large primes p and q that safisfy p = 3(mod 4) and q = 3 (mod 4), and computes n = p'q. Next, the user selects a random integer b E (0, n) and computes B = b4 mod n. After that, the user publishes (n, B) as his public key and keeps (b, p, q) as his secret key.
Signature generation: Suppose user U, wants to sign a message m for the verifier U,. First, U, uses a predefined one-way hash functionf to compress w2 into m' =Am). Then, U, generates the signature (s, t) for m according to the following four cases:
, then let t = 0 and compute s satis- Note that like the Harn-Kiesler scheme [7] , the compressed message m' shall be restricted to the condition that gcd(m', n) = 1 for protecting p and q from being disclosed.
Improvement:
We first introduce some preliminaries, which will be used in the improvement, with respect to the quadratic residue problem. (iv) If a E NQR, and a E NQR,, then -a E QRn. Now, the improvement of the Nyang-Song scheme is described in the following.
System initialisation: Initially, each user selects two large primes p and q satisfying p = 3 (mod 8) and q = -1 (mod S), and computes n = p q . After that, the user publishes n as his public key and keeps @, q) as his secret key. Again, in the improved version, the compressed message m ' shall be restricted to the condition that gcd(m', n ) = 1 for protecting the secret parameters p and q from being disclosed. From theorem 5, it can be seen that all signature equations used in the improvement are solvable.
Pevformance and storage requirement: The following notations are used for analysing the computational complexity and storage requirement of the improvement:
TL: the time for obtaining the value of Legendre symbol T, : the time for finding square roots modulo n.
q: the time for executing one calculation of the adopted oneTm: the time for executing one modular multiplication.
way hash function f.
The computational complexity of signature generation in both the Nyang-Song scheme and the improvement is 2TL+TsR+Tm, on average. The computational complexity of signature verification in the improvement is 2Tm+T,, while two extra modular multiplications are needed in the Nyang-Song scheme.
In the Nyang-Song scheme, each of the public key and the secret key is 21nl bits, and the size of a signature is (n(+l bits. However, in the improvement, each of the public and the secret keys is shortened to I n1 bits, and the size of a signature is ln1+2 bits.
Security analysis:
We will look at some ways in which an adversary may attempt the attacks on the improvement, just as he attempts the attacks on the Nyang-Song scheme.
Attack 1: An adversary attempts an attack by revealing the secret key for any user from public information. Analysis of attack I : First of all, an adversary may factor n directly for finding p and q, however, it is based on the factoring problem [lo, 111. Next, if the adversary knows the signature (s, t) of m, then he can obtain s2 -tm' from the signature verification equation, which implies s2 -tm' = k p and s2 -t,m' = k'.q, for k and K are some integers. From the Chinese remainder theorem
[lo], we know that s2 -t.m' = c x , where c is a constant. Therefore, the adversary cannot obtainp and q with knowing the signature of a message.
Attack 2: An adversary attempts an attack by forging a valid signature for impersonating any user without knowing the secret key for that user.
Analysis of attack 2: Given m' = Am) for some message m, an adversary may first fx t chosen from 0 1 , C L } and then compute the square roots of t.m' modulo n. However, the adversary will face the difficulty of the quadratic residue problem to compute the square roots of tm' modulo n without knowingp and q [1 - 91. An alternative approach is that the adversary may first fix s and then compute t from the signature verification equation. That is, the adversary could compute t = SZ (")-I
mod n, where t should be in {?I, S}. However, the probability of finding such t is 4/n, which approximates to the probability of giving t and m' to choose an s from Z, satisfying the signature verification equation without knowingp and q.
